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NOTE
Risk of Choking to Death on One’s Own
Blood Is Not Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
Calla M. Mears*

I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri began executing inmates in 1810 by hanging Peter Johnson, a
man accused of murder.1 Since Johnson’s execution, Missouri executed 374
inmates between 1810 and 2019.2 Hanging was the most common method of
execution in Missouri until 1936.3 Lethal gas was first used in Missouri in
1937 and became the most common execution method until 1987, when lethal
injection took over as the predominant method.4
Russell Bucklew is hardly the first person to challenge Missouri’s lethal
injection protocol – and for good reason.5 Lethal injection has resulted in a
much greater proportion of botched executions than any other execution
method, at 7.12%, with 75 out of 1054 executions by lethal injection going
wrong.6 Given the high rate of botched executions, challenged lethal injection

* B.A., University of Missouri, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2021; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021. I would like to
thank Dean Litton for his insight and guidance during the writing of this Note, as well
as the Missouri Law Review for its assistance in the editorial process.
1. Missouri, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stateand-federal-info/state-by-state/missouri [perma.cc/ZR97-B67D].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th Cir. 2007); Clemons v.
Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 2009).
6. Botched
Executions,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/botched-executions [perma.cc/264G-CT9T]
(“Botched executions occur when there is a breakdown in, or departure from, the
‘protocol’ for a particular method of execution . . . Botched executions are ‘those
involving unanticipated problems or delays that caused, at least arguably, unnecessary
agony for the prisoner or that reflect gross incompetence of the executioner.”). The
botched execution rates are as follows for the other methods used: 3.12% of hangings,

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 26

610

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

protocols deserve less deference than the United States Supreme Court has
generally given them.
Bucklew was convicted and sentenced to death in 1997 for a crime spree
of murder, burglary, and kidnapping.7 On June 25, 2019, a final warrant of
execution was ordered for Bucklew.8 The process leading to the final
execution order was long, arduous, and filled with questionable judicial
reasoning. Part II of this Note first walks through the factual underpinnings
of Bucklew’s case and the various steps of litigation that led to the instant
decision. It explores Bucklew’s direct appeal, the inmate class action lawsuit
he joined, his habeas corpus claim, the various Eighth Circuit decisions, and
the Supreme Court decision. Next, Part III outlines the background of death
penalty jurisprudence, the history of execution methods in the United States,
and recent challenges to lethal injection. Part IV then details the Supreme
Court’s holding and reasoning, the two concurring opinions, and the two
dissenting opinions. Finally, Part V critiques the majority’s holding and
reasoning and addresses practical implications and theoretical concerns that
result from the majority’s decision.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On March 21, 1996, Russell Bucklew followed his ex-girlfriend,
Stephanie Ray, to a home in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri that she shared
with her boyfriend, Michael Sanders.9 Bucklew waited outside Ray’s home
for several hours, armed with duct tape, handcuffs, and pistols stolen from his
brother.10 Later that evening, Bucklew entered the home and shot Sanders to
death.11 Bucklew went on to strike Ray with a pistol, handcuff her, and throw
her in his vehicle before driving away.12 Bucklew raped Ray in his vehicle
and drove until he was apprehended by law enforcement following a
shootout.13
In Boone County, Missouri, Bucklew was convicted of murder in the
first degree, burglary in the first degree, and kidnapping.14 The jury found
1.92% of electrocutions, 5.4% of executions by lethal gas, and 0% of executions by
firing squad. The botched execution rate for all methods is 3.15%. Id.
7. Jack Suntrup, Execution Date Set for Missouri Death Row Inmate Convicted
of 1996 Murder, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 25, 2019),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/execution-date-set-formissouri-death-row-inmate-convicted-of/article_8f2c5427-bed3-5df0-bdeff5f976f8dcba.html [perma.cc/RU9D-DR6Z].
8. Id. He was ordered to be executed three times before: in 1998, on April 9,
2014, and on March 20, 2018. Id.
9. State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
10. Id.
11. Id. Sanders’s children were also present at the time of the incident but were
not physically harmed. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 86–87.
14. Id. at 86.
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two aggravating circumstances: that Bucklew committed the crimes of both
burglary and kidnapping during the commission of murder.15 The jury
recommended the death sentence, and the trial court sentenced Bucklew to
death.16 Bucklew challenged his conviction and death sentence on direct
appeal in 1998.17 The Missouri Supreme Court denied all of Bucklew’s
claims18 and affirmed the judgment.19

A. Inmate Class Action Lawsuit
In 2012, Bucklew was one of twenty-one Missouri death row inmates to
challenge the execution protocol issued by the Missouri Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”).20 The action was originally brought as a petition for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the Circuit Court of Cole
County, Missouri before it was removed to federal court in August 2012.21
The new protocol “mandate[d] execution via injection of 2 g[rams] of the
anesthetic propofol and 10 [cubic centimeters] of the pain-suppressant
lidocaine.”22 The plaintiffs argued that the protocol violated the ban on cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Missouri
Constitution by creating a substantial and foreseeable risk of severe pain
during executions.23 After several amendments to the original complaint, the
plaintiffs’ claims were ultimately dismissed on May 2, 2014 for failing to state
any claims upon which relief could be granted.24 The litigation concluded on
May 16, when the plaintiffs refused to correctly re-plead their Eighth
Amendment claim, citing a disagreement with the court’s holding that the
plaintiffs would be required to propose an alternative execution method to
survive the pleading stage.25 After this unsuccessful class action litigation,
Bucklew resorted to challenging his own execution under habeas corpus
law.26

15. Id. at 94.
16. Id. at 86–87.
17. See id.
18. None of the claims made by Bucklew on direct appeal are relevant to the
instant decision.
19. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d at 98.
20. See Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-CV-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155 (W.D.
Mo. Nov. 16, 2012).
21. Id. at *1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014, at *3
(W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014), rev’d, 565 F. App’x 562 (8th Cir. 2014), rev’d and
remanded, 783 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2015).
25. Id.
26. See Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006).
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B. Habeas Corpus Challenge
On April 9, 2014, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered Bucklew’s
execution for May 21.27 Bucklew argued in a motion that a stay of execution
was necessary to determine the risks involved as applied28 to executing him
by lethal injection with the drug pentobarbital.29 To prevail on this motion,
Bucklew was required to prove that there was a substantial likelihood the use
of pentobarbital would cause severe harm.30 Further, he needed to present a
feasible and readily implemented alternative method of execution.31 Bucklew
suffered a rare condition called cavernous hemangioma since infancy.32
Cavernous hemangioma is a condition where “vascular lesions consisting of
abnormally dilated blood vessels” are formed.33 The blood vessels form
“cavern-like” pockets were blood pools and then leaks due to defects in the
walls of the vessels.34 The lesions – varied in size – can cause headaches,
hemorrhages, stroke symptoms, and seizures, depending on the size and
location of the lesion.35 Such symptoms subside and reappear over time
because the pockets change in size as they leak and reabsorb blood.36
Cavernous hemangioma of the uvula is exceedingly rare: as of 2015,
only four cases have been reported in English literature.37 Bucklew’s
cavernous hemangioma primarily involved his face, including his pharynx.38
During an examination by a physician on May 12, 2014, Bucklew had a “very
large vascular mass” that obstructed his airway. According to the examining
physician, his “airway [was] severely compromised or obstructed due to the
27. Order of Execution, State v. Bucklew, No. SC80052 (Mo. Apr. 9, 2014).
28. As-applied challenges are those that argue a law or policy is constitutional on
its face, but unconstitutional as applied in a particular situation. Challenge, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
29. Motion for Stay of Execution at 1, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CVW-BP, 2014 WL 12816298 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014). Missouri adopted the use of
pentobarbital for executions in 2013. MO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, Preparation and
Administration
of
Chemicals
for
Lethal
Injection
(2013),
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/ExecutionProtocols/MissouriProtoc
ol10.18.2013.pdf [perma.cc/3Z85-VNGE].
30. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 F. App’x 562, 564 (8th Cir. 2014).
31. Id.
32. Motion for Stay of Execution at 2, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CVW-BP, 2014 WL 12816298 (Mo. May 19, 2014).
33. Rule 26(a)(2) Supplemental Expert Report of Joel B. Zivot, M.D. at 5,
Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014 (W.D. Mo. May
19, 2014).
34. Id. at 5–6.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Minhua Wang et al., Cavernous Hemangioma of the Uvula: Report a Rare
Case with Literature Review, 8 N. AM. J. OF MED. AND SCI. 56 (2015).
38. Declaration of Joel B. Zivot, M.D. at 3, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss2/26

4

Mears: Risk of Choking to Death on One’s Own Blood Is Not Cruel and Unus

2020]

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

613

hemangiomas.”39 In the motion, Bucklew argued his disorder presented
unique risks in an execution by lethal injection.40 Specifically, Bucklew
contended that Missouri’s lethal injection method would cause him to suffer
severe pain from hemorrhaging or abnormal circulation, leading to a
prolonged execution or that his condition would prevent the drug from
circulating properly.41 Bucklew further claimed that MDOC knew about the
risks and failed to assess them with a proper medical examination.42
In response, the State argued Bucklew failed to show Missouri’s use of
pentobarbital in executions was “sure or very likely to cause serious illness
and needless suffering” or that it would “give rise to sufficiently imminent
dangers.”43 Further, the State claimed Bucklew did not sufficiently “present
a specific, feasible, more humane method of execution.”44 The district court
denied Bucklew’s Motion for Stay of Execution, concluding that his claims
failed as a matter of law.45 In particular, the court held that Bucklew was not
specific enough in his claims and therefore failed to show how the potential
adverse consequences would rise to the level of unconstitutional pain.46 The
court also found that Bucklew did not suggest any feasible alternative methods
of execution.47

C. Eighth Circuit Decisions
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision and granted Bucklew’s motion.48 The
Eighth Circuit determined that Bucklew’s medical evidence, which the State
did not rebut, showed a likelihood of severe pain.49 Further, the court held
Bucklew was not required under current precedent to procure an alternative
method of execution, because his case involved a “specific, medically-based,
as-applied, individual challenge” to his execution method.50 Judge Loken

39. Supplemental Affidavit of Joel B. Zivot, M.D. at 1, Bucklew v. Lombardi,
No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014).
40. Motion for Stay of Execution at 1, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CVW-BP, 2014 WL 12816298 (W.D. Mo.. May 19, 2014).
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 2–5.
43. Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiff Russell Bucklew’s Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and Bucklew’s Motion for
Stay of Execution at 6, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL
2736014 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014).
44. Id. at 7.
45. Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014, at *10
(W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014).
46. Id.
47. Id. at *5.
48. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 F. App’x 562, 564 (8th Cir. 2014).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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dissented and agreed with the court below that Bucklew did not present
specific enough evidence of a risk of unconstitutional pain.51
The next day, May 21, 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted
Bucklew a stay of execution pending disposition of his appeal.52 On rehearing
en banc, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court was premature in
dismissing Bucklew’s complaint sua sponte, because it was not obvious he
could not prevail.53 The court directed the State to timely respond to
Bucklew’s complaint or any amended complaint.54 Additionally, the court
ordered Bucklew to timely present a “feasible, readily implemented
alternative procedure that will significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe
pain and that the State refuses to adopt.”55 On remand, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the State, again holding that Bucklew
did not present sufficient evidence to establish his claim.56 Bucklew again
appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.57
Bucklew’s execution was scheduled for March 20, 2018.58

D. United States Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court granted Bucklew’s Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari and affirmed the courts below.59 Bucklew argued the Eighth
Circuit’s decision should be reversed because (1) it erroneously assumed the
execution would go as intended; (2) it incorrectly applied the “known-andavailable-alternatives requirement,” which was developed for facial
challenges, to Bucklew’s as-applied challenge; and (3) lethal gas would
substantially reduce Bucklew’s risk of suffering.60 The State argued in
response that (1) Bucklew failed to raise a “known and available alternative
method” of execution and failed to show that he was “sure or very likely” to
undergo extreme pain from lethal injection; (2) the alternative method of
execution element applies to as-applied challenges; and (3) Bucklew’s claim
was barred by the statute of limitations because he knew of the factual basis
for his claim in 2008 but did not bring this action until twelve days before his
scheduled execution.61
The Supreme Court disagreed with Bucklew and held that an available
alternative method must be presented in all challenges, whether facial or as
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
(2019).
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 572–73.
Bucklew v. Lombardi, 572 U.S. 1131 (2014).
Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1127 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1128.
Id.
Bucklew v. Precythe, 883 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1090.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019).
Brief for Petitioner at 23–24, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
Brief of Respondents at 20–24, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
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applied.62 The proposed alternative method must be not only feasible but also
“readily implemented.”63 The Court determined Bucklew’s suggested method
of execution – nitrogen hypoxia – did not adequately show an available
alternative because it had never been used by the State.64 The State of
Missouri was entitled to summary judgment on Bucklew’s Eighth
Amendment claim because his proposed alternative method of execution was
neither feasible nor readily implemented, and even if Bucklew met both of
those requirements, he did not present enough evidence to show his method
would substantially reduce his risk of pain.65

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Capital punishment has existed since at least the Eighteenth Century
B.C.E.66 Death penalty jurisprudence has a lengthy history that goes back
further than the founding of the United States.67 This Section first examines
the history of capital punishment in the United States and the application of
the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment. Next, it details the history of
modern lethal injection challenges following the reinstation of capital
punishment in 1976. This Section then turns to modern challenges that
fundamentally altered the legal landscape for lethal injection challenges, first
outlining those brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (“Section 1983”).
Finally, it looks at the effects of two landmark cases, Baze v. Rees and Glossip
v. Gross, on death penalty jurisprudence.

A. A History of Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment
Capital punishment in the United States has steadily evolved from
barbaric roots that allowed a variety of execution methods to the modern
conception of a clinical procedure primarily involving lethal injection.68 In
the early days of the country’s existence, judges had discretion to choose
execution methods.69 The possible methods were beheading, drowning,

62. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1126.
63. Id. at 1129. A proposed method is “readily implemented” when it is
sufficiently detailed to allow a finding that it could be carried out reasonably quickly
and relatively easily by the State. Id.
64. Id. at 1129–30.
65. Id. at 1133.
66. The first historical mention of capital punishment was in the Code of King
Hammurabi of Babylon. History of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/history-of-the-death-penalty/earlyhistory-of-the-death-penalty [perma.cc/G6PT-U4ZT].
67. Id.
68. Chris Fisher, Evolution of Execution, CBA Rec. 40, 41 (Sept. 2007).
69. Robert J. Sech, Note, Hang ‘Em High: A Proposal for Thoroughly Evaluating
the Constitutionality of Execution Methods, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 390 (1995).
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hanging, burning, breaking at the wheel, and drawing and quartering.70 Most
executions were carried out by hanging, which remained the most common
method of execution throughout the eighteenth century and the first half of
the nineteenth century.71 Electrocution was introduced in New York as a
supposedly more humane execution method following anti-hanging sentiment
that developed before and during the Civil War.72 By the end of the 1920s,
more than half of all states that imposed capital punishment used
electrocution.73 Lethal gas was introduced in Nevada in 1931 and quickly
expanded to other states as another common execution method.74
Cruel and unusual punishment, which was originally interpreted by
courts to mean inhumane and barbarous punishment, is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.75 Early courts did not
provide a comprehensive definition of cruel and unusual punishment, but
additional standards were developed by the Supreme Court.76 A state’s
method of execution must not involve torture or lingering death, as any
punishment involving torture violates the Eighth Amendment.77 The
punishment must comply with modern civilized standards to be consistent
with human dignity.78 States are prohibited from intentionally inflicting
unnecessary pain.79
Courts have long been inconsistent in analyses used to determine
whether a certain punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. Rather than
following uniform standards or rules, courts are largely left to determine
whether the punishment “comports with contemporary standards of
decency.”80 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the State has
a duty under the Eighth Amendment to assume responsibility for the wellbeing and safety of the individuals incarcerated in its prisons.81 The Eighth
Amendment now bars more than just physically barbarous punishments.82
The State has an obligation to provide medical care for its prisoners when
denial of such care could result in pain and suffering that serves no

70. Id. at 390–91 n.51.
71. Id. at 391.
72. Id. at 392. A constitutional challenge to New York’s electrocution method
was made in 1890, but it was swiftly denied by the United States Supreme Court. See
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
73. Sech, supra note 69, at 393.
74. Id. at 393–94.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see e.g., McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E.
874, 875 (Mass. 1899).
76. See e.g., Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436.
77. Id. at 447; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
78. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
79. Louisiana ex rel. Frances v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
80. See e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 1994).
81. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200
(1989).
82. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
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penological purpose because the infliction of such suffering does not comport
with modern standards of decency.83 The Supreme Court held in Estelle v.
Gamble that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners
establishes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in violation of the
Eighth Amendment and sufficiently states a cause of action under Section
1983,84 which grants a cause of action to any citizen subjected to the
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws” under the laws or customs of any state.85 Helling v.
McKinney established that prisoners can bring Eighth Amendment claims
under Section 1983 for possible risk of future harm to health caused by
deliberate indifference, even if there is no current risk of harm.86

B. Modern Challenges to Lethal Injection
In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court effectively deemed all death
penalty statutes unconstitutional because of arbitrary application and lack of
guidance for juries.87 After being prohibited briefly, capital punishment was
reestablished by the Supreme Court in 1976.88 Following the reinstatement,
Oklahoma was the first state to adopt lethal injection on May 11, 1977; Texas
adopted it the next day, and New Mexico and Idaho adopted it soon after.89
Thirty-seven states adopted lethal injection between 1977 and 2002, and
Texas was the first to use it for an execution in 1982.90 Today, all twentynine death penalty states use lethal injection as their primary method of
execution, even if it offers other methods.91 Most modern lethal injection
challenges have focused on either the drugs used or the injection procedure.92
The writ of habeas corpus was first established in the Magna Carta in
1215 as a way for prisoners to challenge the legality of their detention.93 In

83. Id. at 102–03.
84. Id. at 104–05.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
86. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
87. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256–57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
88. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (holding that Georgia’s revised
capital punishment statute was sufficiently structured to prevent its arbitrary
application, effectively providing a way for the other states to reinstate capital
punishment).
89. Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has
Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 78 (2007).
90. Id. at 78–79.
91. Methods
of
Execution,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-of-execution
[perma.cc/YHL42LA2]. Other methods include electrocution, lethal gas, hanging, and firing squad.
92. Jerry Merrill, Comment, The Past, Present, & Future of Lethal Injection:
Baze v. Rees’ Effect on the Death Penalty, 77 UMKC L. REV. 161, 171 (2008).
93. Benjamin R. Orye III, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When A Judgment of Conviction
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the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted federal courts the power
to grant the writ to federal prisoners.94 While it could initially only be used to
challenge the jurisdiction of the sentencing body, the Supreme Court
expanded it in 1942 to include challenges based on other constitutional
grounds.95 Since 1942, habeas corpus relief has been available to an inmate
when, inter alia, his or her conviction or sentence was obtained in violation
of a federal constitutional right.96 In the past, those on death row often used
habeas corpus to challenge their sentences.
Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEPDA”) in 1996 to further regulate federal habeas corpus actions.97
AEPDA imposed a variety of restrictions on habeas corpus petitions and
effectively limited such petitions so that they could only be brought shortly
after the exhaustion of all direct appeals.98 AEDPA prohibited all “second or
successive habeas corpus application[s]” presented in a prior petition and
banned those not previously presented with a few narrow exceptions.99 A
petitioner can bring a claim in a successive application only if he or she can
show that it “relies on a new rule of constitutional law . . . that was previously
unavailable” or if new evidence that could not have previously been found is
discovered and no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner
guilty given the new evidence.100 All other habeas corpus claims must be filed
within one year of final judgment for claims on direct appeal.101

1. Section 1983 Challenges
AEDPA made lethal injection challenges nearly impossible because
execution dates are not always set before the one-year limit for a habeas
corpus action expires.102 In 2004, however, the Supreme Court allowed
prisoners to challenge execution protocols under Section 1983.103 While a
habeas corpus petition would entirely invalidate a conviction or sentence, a
Section 1983 claim would enjoin the State from any action that would

Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441,
444 (2002).
94. Id. at 446. The writ’s application was expanded to state prisoners in 1867.
Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2018). Habeas corpus actions are petitions filed by inmates
challenging the legality of the petitioner’s detention or imprisonment. Habeas
Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
98. Merrill, supra note 92, at 169.
99. § 2244(b)(1)–(2).
100. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B)(ii).
101. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
102. Merrill, supra note 92, at 169.
103. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644–46 (2004).
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constitute a civil rights violation.104 In Nelson v. Campbell, the Supreme
Court reasoned that an execution method could be challenged without
invalidating the execution itself.105 In Nelson, for example, the challenged
method was a “cut-down” procedure that would be used to access the
petitioner’s veins.106 The Court ultimately remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether the “cut-down” procedure was necessary to
administer the lethal injection.107 If the procedure was found unnecessary, the
State would be required to provide an alternative method of vein access but
the execution would still be carried out via lethal injection.108
In 2006, the Supreme Court extended Nelson to allow Section 1983
claims to challenge the entire lethal injection procedure rather than just
components of the procedure.109 In Hill v. McDonough, petitioner Hill
brought a Section 1983 claim challenging the common three-drug sequence
Florida planned on using to execute him.110 The courts below construed Hill’s
claim as a habeas corpus petition and denied it for failing to comply with the
stringent requirements imposed by AEDPA.111 The Supreme Court held that
Nelson was controlling because Hill’s claim did not challenge the lethal
injection sentence generally but rather sought to prevent the State from
executing him with a particular lethal injection method.112 The Court also
found it important that Florida law did not require the use of the planned
execution method, so the State could conceivably use an alternative lethal
injection procedure.113 When taken together, Nelson and Hill opened the
floodgates for lethal injection challenges under Section 1983.114
104. Merrill, supra note 92, at 169.
105. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644.
106. Id. at 642. The “cut-down” procedure at issue in Nelson consisted of “prison
personnel . . . mak[ing] a 2-inch incision in petitioner’s arm or leg; the procedure
would take place one hour before the schedule execution; and only local anesthesia
would be used” because he had compromised veins. Id. at 641.
107. Id. at 646.
108. Id. at 644.
109. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 580 (2006).
110. Id. at 576.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 580.
113. Id. at 573–74.
114. See e.g., Jackson v. Taylor, No. Civ. 06-300-SLR, 2006 WL 1237044 at *1
(D. Del. May 9, 2006) (“[I]t was agreed that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill will
have a dispositive effect on plaintiff’s claims and that staying this litigation is the most
prudent course of action.”); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979–80, 983–84
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (ordering the State to address deficiencies in its execution procedure,
such as unreliable and inconsistent screening of the execution team; a lack of
supervision, oversight, and training; poor record-keeping; improper mixing and
preparation of one of the drugs to be administered; and poor working conditions for
the execution team); Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 903 (M.D. Tenn. 2007),
vacated, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that Tennessee’s three-drug protocol
did have unnecessary and inherent risks of severe pain, and the State was deliberately

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 26

620

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

2. The Baze-Glossip Test
In 2008, a group of inmates in Kentucky unsuccessfully challenged the
lethal injection execution method in Baze v. Rees.115 The inmates claimed
that the risk the lethal injection procedure will not be properly administered
violated the Eighth Amendment.116 The Court held the possibility that an
execution method may result in pain does not establish an “objectively
intolerable risk of harm” that amounts to cruel and unusual harm.117 The
Court further concluded that proposing a “slightly or marginally safer
alternative” is not sufficient under the Eighth Amendment to challenge a
state’s method of execution.118 Rather, there must be a substantial risk of
serious pain and “the alternative procedure must be feasible, readily
implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe
pain.”119
In 2015, the Supreme Court added to the Baze decision in Glossip v.
Gross. There, a group of Oklahoma inmates on death row challenged the use
of midazolam in Oklahoma’s execution protocol as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment for its risk of failing to desensitize the inmates from pain.120 The
Supreme Court found Baze to be controlling and set out two requirements to
successfully enjoin a state’s execution method.121 First, a petitioner must
establish that he or she can show a likelihood that the state’s lethal injection
protocol creates a proven risk of severe pain.122 Second, a petitioner must
show that the alleged risk is substantial compared to available known
alternatives.123 The Court ultimately determined that the inmates in Glossip
failed to sufficiently show that midazolam created a substantial risk of harm
as compared to any known and available alternative.124 The effects of Baze
and Glossip on death penalty jurisprudence were great. When considered
indifferent by rejecting a proposed one-drug protocol); Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d
1072, 1080, 1083 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that an “unnecessary risk of causing wanton
infliction of pain” is a sufficient basis to challenge an execution protocol, but
determining that the State’s practice of not requiring anesthesiologist involvement was
not a violation of the Eighth Amendment). Missouri’s execution protocol was
challenged again in 2009 by eight inmates who argued that the State’s previously
employing unqualified and incompetent execution team members violated the Eighth
Amendment. The Eighth Circuit found that to be an insufficient basis for an Eighth
Amendment execution protocol challenge. See Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119
(8th Cir. 2009).
115. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008).
116. Id. at 49.
117. Id. at 50.
118. Id. at 51.
119. Id. at 52.
120. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015).
121. Id. at 2737.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2737–38.
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together, the two cases formed a test for challenges to execution methods: the
petitioner must show that there is a substantial likelihood the challenged
method creates a risk of severe pain and that there is a feasible and readily
available alternative method. The Supreme Court used the Baze-Glossip test
to analyze Bucklew’s claim.125

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The United States Supreme Court rejected Bucklew’s as-applied
challenge for a variety of reasons. This Section reviews the majority’s holding
and reasoning. Next, it briefly looks at the concurring opinions, before finally
examining the dissenting opinions.

A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court upheld Bucklew’s execution method in a five-tofour decision with two concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions.126
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Gorsuch, began by addressing
Bucklew’s argument that the Baze-Glossip test should only apply to facial
challenges and not to as-applied challenges such as his.127 The Court first
noted that the Constitution permits – but does not require – states to authorize
capital punishment, and the Supreme Court may only prohibit execution
methods that are cruel and unusual.128 The majority went on to detail the
history of the Eighth Amendment and how it has been applied to capital
punishment.129 The Court paid particular attention to the historical meaning
of “cruel and unusual” punishment and noted how its original intention was
to prevent execution methods akin to torture.130 The majority also mentioned
how the predominant execution method at the time of the Eighth
Amendment’s adoption was hanging, which was considered more humane
than other punishments yet “was no guarantee of a quick and painless
death.”131 The Court reiterated that the Eighth Amendment only bans
punishment that superimposes additional elements of terror or pain and
emphasized that no challenged execution method has ever been found by the
Court to be cruel and unusual.132
Bucklew argued that the Baze-Glossip test only applied to facial
challenges because “there is no risk that an as-applied claim will function as
a back-door attack on the constitutionality of the death penalty.”133 The Court
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1128 (2019).
See id.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1122–23.
Id. at 1123–24.
Id.
Id. at 1124.
Id.; Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015).
Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
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denied Bucklew’s argument because Glossip expressly stated that identifying
an available alternative is required for all Eighth Amendment execution
method challenges.134 The majority went on to simplify the difference
between facial and as-applied challenges as being a mere difference in breadth
of people affected and remedies available.135 The majority reasoned that to
determine whether a method of execution is unconstitutionally painful
necessarily requires a comparison to an alternative method.136 The Court
denied Bucklew’s argument on a second ground. Specifically, the majority
found that his reasoning was inconsistent with the original meaning of the
Eighth Amendment, which the Court stated was to prevent the infliction of
more pain than is necessary to carry out an execution.137 The majority also
took issue with the line-drawing problem present in Bucklew’s suggestion that
challenges like his would not lead to a categorical ban on certain punishments
and questioned whether an inmate with a common – but not universal –
disorder challenging an execution method would be considered facial or asapplied.138 Finally, the Court downplayed the burden Bucklew must carry to
present an alternative execution method because he was not limited only to
methods currently authorized by Missouri.139 The majority maintained,
however, that the State could present a legitimate reason why it would not
decline the proposed alternative.140
After finding that Baze and Glossip apply to all lethal injection
challenges, the Court next turned to whether Bucklew’s claim would satisfy
the Baze-Glossip test.141 The alternative method Bucklew proposed –
nitrogen hypoxia – was rejected by the Court for two reasons.142 First,
Bucklew was not specific enough in describing the alternative method for it
to be readily implemented.143 Second, the State had a legitimate reason for
declining to switch from its current method because the proposed alternative
had never been carried out and Missouri would be the first.144 The Court also
determined that Bucklew did not show his alternative method would
significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain because the risks he
alleged were too speculative and not supported by evidence.145 The Court

134. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1126.
135. Id. at 1127–28.
136. Id. at 1126.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1128.
139. Id.
140. Id. The bar for presenting a reason not to adopt the proposed alternative
method is low. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 57 (2008) (a state has a legitimate
interest in using a method that “preserv[es] the dignity of the procedure”).
141. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1129. Because summary judgment was granted below,
the decision hinged on whether Bucklew presented a genuine issue of material fact.
142. Id. at 1129–30.
143. Id. at 1129.
144. Id. at 1129–30.
145. Id. at 1130–33.
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finally concluded that Bucklew managed to extend his case longer than
necessary to the detriment of the people of Missouri and Bucklew’s victims.146
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that the Eighth Amendment
was only designed to prevent the intentional infliction of pain, and therefore,
Bucklew’s claim failed because the pain alleged would not be inflicted
intentionally.147 In a separate concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh agreed with
the majority but emphasized that the proposed alternative method of execution
does not have to be authorized under current state law.148

B. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent and joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded Bucklew’s proposed execution was a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.149 The dissent determined that summary
judgment should not have been granted to the State because Bucklew provided
expert testimony, which established a genuine issue of material fact that
should have gone to trial.150 Justice Breyer disagreed with the application of
Glossip to this case, determining that its alternative method requirement
should not apply to as-applied challenges such as Bucklew’s.151 The dissent
also disagreed with the majority’s view that nitrogen hypoxia would be
difficult to implement, citing reports in evidence saying it would be “simple
to administer.”152 The dissent further argued that Glossip did not require
evidence on “essential questions,” such as when and how the nitrogen should
be administered.153 Finally, the dissent agreed with the majority that the time
between conviction and execution was “excessive” but disagreed with the
majority’s solution of “curtailing constitutional guarantees afforded to
prisoners like Bucklew who have been sentenced to death.”154
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate dissenting opinion to emphasize this
point, stating “[t]here are higher values than ensuring that executions run on
time. If a death sentence or the manner in which it is carried out violates the
Constitution, that stain can never come out. Our jurisprudence must remain
one of vigilance and care, not one of dismissiveness.”155

146. Id. at 1134.
147. Id. at 1135 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 1135–36 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 1136 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (first, Justice Breyer argued that Bucklew
established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he would face extreme
suffering; second, he considered whether a prisoner with a rare medical condition must
identify an alternative method; finally, he addressed the issue of minimizing delays in
executing death row offenders).
150. Id. at 1137–39.
151. Id. at 1140.
152. Id. at 1142–43.
153. Id. at 1143.
154. Id. at 1144.
155. Id. at 1148 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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V. COMMENT
There are several problems with the outcome of this case that raise a
variety of concerns. This Section focuses on both the problems with the
Court’s holding and reasoning as well as its broader implications. First, this
Section addresses and critiques the majority and concurring opinions. Next, it
outlines the practical implications that result. Finally, it highlights theoretical
and moral concerns that arise from this decision.

A. The Court’s Incorrect Application of Legal Standards and Policies
The majority opinion answered two questions and addressed an
additional policy issue. The first question was whether inmates making asapplied challenges to execution methods should be held to the same standard
as those making facial challenges.156 The second question was whether
Bucklew raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Missouri’s
lethal injection protocol would cause a substantial risk of severe harm, and if
so, whether there was an available known alternative method of execution.157
The majority implied the importance of timeliness in carrying out executions
and used that as an underlying policy argument throughout the opinion.158
The majority maintained that Glossip is directly controlling in this case
because Glossip stated in clear terms that an available alternative method is
“require[d] of all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims”
challenging unconstitutional pain.159 This reasoning is flawed, however,
because the circumstances in Glossip were different than those present here.
The inmates in Glossip were challenging the entire execution method
employed by the state of Oklahoma, whereas Bucklew argued that it would
be unconstitutional when applied to him alone.160 The distinction is important
when considering the policy behind Glossip and how that policy does not
apply in this case.161 The Court in Glossip was concerned with inmates using
Section 1983 execution method challenges as a backdoor means of abolishing
capital punishment altogether.162 While a valid concern under the
circumstances of Glossip, that concern was not relevant to Bucklew’s case.
Bucklew individually getting a different execution method would not
invalidate Missouri’s execution method nor would it prevent other death row
inmates from being executed under Missouri’s current protocol.163

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1129.
See id.
Id. at 1124 (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015)).
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1118.
Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1140 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33.
Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1140 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Like Baze, the Court in Glossip was also concerned with giving
deference to state legislatures and their chosen execution methods.164 Again,
while a valid consideration in those cases, that concern is not applicable here
because the Missouri legislature could not predict which methods might be
unconstitutionally painful for individuals with rare medical conditions.165
Even when accepting Glossip as controlling, there are attributes of the Glossip
opinion that raise concern with the Court’s precedent.166 In the 136 years of
execution method challenges between Wilkerson v. Utah and Glossip, no
decision imposed a requirement that an inmate plead an alternative method of
execution until Glossip.167 On the contrary, Hill v. McDonough expressly
rejected the notion.168 The majority in Glossip asserted that Hill was not
controlling and dismissed it as a procedural case rather than a substantive one
– but the issue at hand in Bucklew’s case was both procedural and
substantive.169 The majority also erred when it contrasted lethal injection with
the barbarous and torturous execution methods employed in the past, which it
alleged the Eighth Amendment is meant to prohibit.170 Although lethal
injection may generally not be considered torturous, Bucklew argued that,
when applied to him, there was a substantial risk that it would be excruciating
and have the effects of torture.171 The majority essentially responded that the
State could execute him with lethal injection anyway.172
Even accepting the majority’s holding that Baze and Glossip apply,
Bucklew clearly raised a triable issue of fact as to whether there was an
available alternative method. Because the posture below was a grant of
summary judgment to the State, the applicable standard for the State to prevail
on appeal is whether “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”173
The record, including “depositions, documents, [and] affidavits or
declarations” must be viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.174 Bucklew presented a plethora of evidence via expert
164. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008).
165. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1141 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. Wilkerson v. Utah is the oldest method-of-execution case that went to the
Supreme Court. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
168. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582 (2006) (“[t]he United States as amicus
curiae contends that a capital litigant’s § 1983 action can proceed if, as in Nelson, . . .
the prisoner identifies an alternative, authorized method of execution. . . . [E]ven if
the United States’ proposed limitation were likely to be effective we could not accept
it.”).
169. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738–39.
170. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1122–24. The Eighth Amendment is interpreted under
an “evolving standards of decency” test, changing the definition of “cruel and
unusual” over time to reflect societal norms and expectations. Merrill, supra note 92,
at 177.
171. Brief for Petitioner at 10–13, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
172. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1133.
173. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
174. Id.; Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014).
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testimony showing a high likelihood he would experience suffocation and
excruciating pain for up to several minutes.175 The district court refused to
grant summary judgment to the State on the issue, holding that the dispute
between Bucklew’s expert and the State’s expert created a factual issue not
resolvable on summary judgment.176 Bucklew’s expert also “strongly
disagree[d] with [the State expert’s] repeated claim that the pentobarbital
injection would result in ‘rapid unconsciousness.’”177
The majority essentially ignored all of Bucklew’s expert testimony and
concluded that there was no evidence he would experience pain for more than
twenty to thirty seconds after the injection.178 Whether the expert would
ultimately be correct was a question of fact and therefore not appropriate to
consider at the summary judgment stage. Bucklew also showed a genuine
issue of fact as to whether there was an available alternative method. He
identified nitrogen hypoxia – a method permitted by Missouri law179 – as an
alternative.180 Bucklew introduced studies from states that specifically
authorize nitrogen hypoxia as an alternative method showing that it is quick,
less likely to be painful, and easy to implement.181 The majority again ignored
evidence introduced by Bucklew and concluded that “nothing on the record”
showed lethal injection would take longer than nitrogen hypoxia to effectuate
and Bucklew’s evidence did not show that it would be easy to implement.182
Had the Court correctly adhered to the summary judgment standard, Bucklew
would have had an opportunity to move forward with his case.
The majority also mistakenly focused on the timeliness of Bucklew’s
execution as a policy argument. Bucklew was sentenced to death more than
twenty years ago.183 However, Bucklew’s case is not an anomaly; the average
time between sentencing and execution has risen from just over six years in
1984 to more than twenty years in 2017.184 There are important reasons to be
concerned with the increasing length of time between sentencing and
execution. It “frustrates the interests of the State and of surviving victims,
who have ‘an important interest’ in seeing justice done quickly.”185 Lengthy
175. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1138 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1133. “[A]ny conscious sensation of suffocation, asphyxiation,
burning, or other extreme pain that remained present for as little as a few seconds”
constitutes unnecessary pain. Brenton Schick, Lethal Injection, Cruel and Unusual?
Establishing A Demonstrated Risk of Severe Pain: Morales v. Cate, 623 F.3d 828 (9th
Cir. 2010), 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 182 (2011).
179. MO. REV. STAT. § 546.720 (2018).
180. Brief for Petitioner at 15–16, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
181. Id.
182. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1132, 1129.
183. State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
184. Time on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/death-row-time-on-death-row
[perma.cc/P87M-7XL6].
185. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006).
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stays are costly to the State and may also intensify the suffering accompanying
the execution itself by increasing time in solitary confinement.186 Delays also
undermine the deterrent and retributive effects of capital punishment.187
These concerns, however, must not outweigh the constitutional protections
that are guaranteed to death row inmates.188 In 2018, a Gallup poll showed
that less than half of Americans think the death penalty is applied fairly.189
With that little trust in the fairness of capital punishment procedures, the law
must “ensur[e] that we accurately identify, through procedurally fair methods,
those who may lawfully be put to death.”190 We simply cannot have it both
ways; either we care about constitutional safeguards or we care about speedy
outcomes. When dealing with something as irreversible as taking lives, we
must prioritize constitutional protections over timeliness.

B. Practical Implications
The majority faulted Bucklew for not outlining his proposed alternative
method with painstaking detail and particularity.191 For example, the Court
criticized him for failing to specify the required concentration of nitrogen
hypoxia, the vessel needed to administer the drug, and how to protect the
execution team from possible gas leaks.192 There are two problems with this
reasoning. First, Glossip did not impose any requirement that an inmate
pleading an alternative method must give guidance down to the last detail.193
The majority devised these requirements sua sponte and did not give Bucklew
any notice that he would be required to plead such details. Second, these
requirements effectively make it impossible for any inmate’s as-applied
execution method challenge to prevail.194 This creates a serious line-drawing
issue because the Court could find fault with claims from future petitioners
for not including any new required detail the Court decides is relevant and
necessary.
This also presents an issue of burden shifting. Requiring a death row
inmate to propose an alternative method of his own execution when the State
has better resources to make such determinations is facially unfair. However,
accepting that an inmate must plead an alternative method because a state
cannot predict the particularized needs of individuals, the feasible and readily
implemented standard should be relaxed. When weighing the effects on both
parties, the State is better equipped to prove the dignity of an execution
186. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2764–67 (2015).
187. Id. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1145 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189. Death
Penalty,
GALLUP,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/deathpenalty.aspx.
190. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1145 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 1129.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1143 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. Id.
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method than an inmate is to prove a potentially a gruesome death at the hands
of the government.
Not only is it absurd to expect so much from an inmate, it is also unfair
because most inmates challenging their execution method lack the resources
to adequately prove the alternative. Inmates in this position have no way of
knowing this information and obtaining it is surely difficult. Even if they
could research and provide some detail, the inmate likely is not a medical
doctor or a safety expert. Further, defendants probably do not have the money
to hire experts to prepare all of this information. Most importantly, is it not
cruel and unusual in itself to force an inmate to research, choose, and present
their preferred method of death?

C. Theoretical Concerns
Justice Breyer perfectly encapsulated the biggest problem with the
majority opinion when he wrote:
[T]his case adds to the mounting evidence that we can either have a
death penalty that avoids excessive delays and “arguably serves
legitimate penological purposes,” or we can have a death penalty that
“seeks reliability and fairness in the death penalty’s application” and
avoids the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. . . . It may well
be that we “cannot have both.”195

The reasoning given by the majority can be rationalized within the
confines of modern death penalty jurisprudence. However, the fact that there
is even a debate about something as repugnant as whether an individual must
prove a less gruesome way for himself to die should give pause to any
reasonable person.
Capital punishment has evolved to become something clinical and
unseen. For most of this country’s history, the death penalty was a gruesome
public spectacle and typically involved public hangings that drew large
crowds.196 Now, state-sanctioned executions are done in small, clinical rooms
with the assistance of medical personnel, and are not seen by many people.197
In fact, the very reason we have lethal injection is because of the growing
discomfort that resulted from both needless suffering from less
195. Id. at 1145 (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer,
J., dissenting)).
196. Sech, supra note 69, at 391.
197. Julian Davis Mortenson, Earning the Right to Be Retributive: Execution
Methods, Culpability Theory, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 88
IOWA L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2003). When executions moved away from the public view
to take place in prisons, many states enacted statutes dictating who could attend, but a
jurisdictional split has emerged regarding whether there is a First Amendment right to
witness executions. Shira Poliak, The Logic of Experience: The Role of History in
Recognizing Public Rights of Access Under the First Amendment, 167 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1561, 1580 (2019).
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technologically advanced execution methods, such as hanging and
electrocution, and from the prospect of executing an innocent person.198 The
difference between executions in the past and executions now is that we are
able to argue about them in the abstract; most people are not affected by
capital punishment, do not watch it take place, and often do not even know it
is happening. Execution methods are easy to discuss when we are not forced
to experience them. Overlooking whether a method is actually cruel is easy
when we do not have to observe the execution.
Capital punishment is withering away in part due to squeamishness felt
toward it by Americans.199 This raises the question, why allow capital
punishment at all if we are not comfortable with the reality of executions?
Most democratic countries have abolished the death penalty and moved
forward, leaving us in the company of authoritarian regimes.200 Many of the
countries that have yet to abolish capital punishment still allow public
hangings, which at least speaks to one of the penological purposes of the death
penalty – deterrence.201 In the United States, with executions done in secrecy,
it is hard to see which – if any – penological purposes are still served.
Another problem with the death penalty is that cruel and unusual
punishment is a subjective standard.202 A major attribute of the Eighth
Amendment is that it is not interpreted as a static concept but rather as a
standard that evolves and changes over time to match what society accepts as
decent.203 This concept has allowed the Supreme Court to maintain a vague
standard and alter it as needed to fit within the zeitgeist as it changes.204 Under
this method of interpretation, the Court has been able to build upon standards
of decency to become more restrictive over time.205 Because of its inherent
subjectivism, relying on the Eighth Amendment as a constitutional protection
for inmates challenging their methods of execution is lackluster.
More concerning, however, is the Court’s seeming departure from the
evolving standards of decency analysis and its revival of applying
constitutional originalism206 to Eighth Amendment execution method
challenges. The Court has applied the evolving standards of decency test
198. Mortenson, supra note 197, at 1102–03.
199. Richard Cohen, Why Haven’t We Abolished the Death Penalty and Moved
On?, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blog
s/post-partisan/wp/2017/11/08/why-havent-we-abolished-the-death-penalty-andmoved-on/ [perma.cc/2PD8-AGFY].
200. Death Penalty in 2018: Facts and Figures, AMNESTY INT’L, (April 10, 2019),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/death-penalty-facts-and-figures2018/ [perma.cc/NQ4S-DLDV].
201. Id.
202. Fisher, supra note 68, at 42.
203. Merrill, supra note 92, at 77.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Originalism is a method of interpretation that requires the reader to analyze
historical legal documents through the lens of what the writer(s) meant it to mean at
the time. Originalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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since 1958, when it determined that “the words of the Amendment are not
price, and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”207 The majority in Bucklew seemed to make an originalist argument
for capital punishment when it noted that “death was ‘the standard penalty for
all serious crimes’ at the time of the founding”208 and that “methods of
execution like these [dragging the prisoner to the place of execution,
disemboweling, quartering, public dissection, and burning alive] readily
qualified as ‘cruel and unusual,’ as a reader at the time of the Eighth
Amendment’s adoption would have understood those words.”209 While the
evolving standards of decency test is subjective in nature, it is a better
alternative than determining whether a punishment was cruel and unusual
more than 200 years ago. Technology has improved since the inception of the
Eighth Amendment, allowing for more humane options. Further, popular
beliefs about capital punishment have evolved and people are no longer
comfortable with gruesome methods of execution.
Execution by a firing squad or by guillotine would likely pass the BazeGlossip test as alternatives that would substantially reduce the risk of severe
pain. Courts and legislatures, however, likely would not consider allowing
something like the guillotine as an execution method because its use is
reminiscent of a darker time in human history.210 Despite its efficiency, the
idea of using a guillotine to conduct executions would probably horrify most
people.211 “The massive, razor-sharp blade coming down, the sound of the
impact, and the bloody end create a nightmarish mental picture. Contrast this
with the sterile, cool room, the needle, and the seemingly serene outcome that
is the expected outcome of lethal injection.”212 The comparison between the
methods of execution suggests that what is cruel and unusual is in the eye of
the beholder.213 If the death penalty is constitutional, then we should at least
recognize it for what it is and embrace quicker, less painful methods of
execution that are much less likely to be botched and also happen to be more
gruesome. If we refuse to allow such shocking execution methods because
we cannot face the grisly reality that is capital punishment, then maybe we
have no business imposing it at all.

VI. CONCLUSION
Since capital punishment was reinstituted in 1976, courts have made it
more and more difficult for inmates to successfully challenge their execution
207. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958).
208. Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1122 (2019) (quoting S. Banner, The
Death Penalty: An American History 23 (2002)).
209. Id. at 1123.
210. Fisher, supra note 68, at 42.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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method, which is almost always lethal injection. The outcome in this case did
nothing to relieve this burden, and in fact, made it more difficult by holding
that the Baze-Glossip test – requiring a showing that a challenged execution
method is substantially likely to result in severe pain and that a known and
readily implemented alternative is available – applies to all execution method
claims, including as-applied challenges. Applying this test, the Court held
that Bucklew did not sufficiently show that he would face a substantial risk of
severe pain under Missouri’s execution method or that his proposed
alternative – nitrogen hypoxia – would be readily implemented or reduce his
risk of pain.
Bucklew v. Precythe presents a variety of practical implications and
theoretical concerns. The standard has now been raised so high that it will be
nearly insurmountable for future petitioners to successfully challenge their
execution methods, whether facially or as applied. In faulting Bucklew for
not pleading his alternative method with painstaking attention to detail, the
Court created a line-drawing problem that will allow courts to move the
goalpost if they are at all in disagreement with a petitioner’s proposed
alternative method. This case finally raises concerns about the purpose of
capital punishment itself. When stepping back to see the big picture of the
issue, the mere fact that there is a debate over whether a person must show an
easier way for him to die at the hands of the government is alarming and raises
the question of why we still have capital punishment. The decision also leads
one to ask whether capital punishment serves any legitimate penological
purposes anymore. Russell Bucklew should have had the opportunity to
litigate his case at trial where a finder of fact could have determined whether
he successfully showed that Missouri’s execution method, as applied to him,
created a substantial risk of severe pain and whether his proposed alternative
would be readily implemented. Instead, he was executed by the state of
Missouri on October 1, 2019.214

214. Jim Salter, Missouri Executes Killer Despite Concern About Painful Death,
AP NEWS (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/612f55aada904cd4832f799996dd
e6d3 [perma.cc/U3YW-X57S].
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